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Abstract
This paper focuses on the size of the borrower group in group lending. We show that, when social
ties in a community enhance borrowersincentives to exert e¤ort, a prot-maximizing nancier chooses a
group of limited size. Borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have insu¢ cient social
ties do not receive funding. The result arises because there is a trade-o¤ between raising prots through
increased group size and providing incentives for borrowers with less social ties. The result may explain
why many micro-lending institutions and rural credit cooperatives lend to groups of small size.
Keywords : Group Lending; Moral Hazard; Social Capital.
JEL Classication : D8; G2.
1 Introduction
Group lending is an unconventional lending arrangement that has been successfully applied to provide credit
to poor people in low income communities. The special feature is that loans are allocated individually
to group members, but all members face consequences if one cannot full repayment obligations. Such
joint liability arrangements are e¤ective in dealing with asymmetric information problems, enhancing the
availability of credit for poor borrowers that traditional commercial banks would not have as customers
(Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). This paper contributes to the literature by developing a simple model of
group lending to address the issue of optimal group size.
The idea behind group lending is that people with connections based on geographical proximity or shared
norms may be able to meet contractual obligations that would be impossible under conventional banking
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agreements. Members of a community may have knowledge of each others types, projects, and actions.
Furthermore, they may inict non-nancial sanctions on delinquent borrowers. The e¤ects of potential
retribution on borrowersincentives to repay may depend on the strength of social ties among community
members.
Although the majority of todays joint liability lending institutions are micronance institutions like
the well-known Grameen Bank in Bangladesh or BancoSol in Bolivia, the traditions of group lending date
back to the mid-19th century when the German rural credit cooperatives were established.1 Both types of
institutions have become well known of their ability to make small loans to borrowers without collateral
valuable for a commercial lender. An important feature for both lending institutions has been that the
borrowers lived in small rural communities, interacted frequently, and belonged to groups organized on the
basis of di¤erent economic and social ties.
Group lending institutions di¤er in the size of the borrower group. At the turn of the 20th century,
most rural credit cooperatives in Germany used to lend to groups of between 75 and 250 members (Ghatak
and Guinnane, 1999). The Grameen bank in Bangladesh is known of its preference towards small groups
of ve members. In their study on group lending programs in Ghana, Owusu and Tetteh (1982) nd that
the number of members in a group varies between 10 and 100. FINCA (Fundacion Integral Campesina),
the international organization, lends to borrower groups of between 10 and 50 members. Devereux and
Fishe (1993) argue that, in the Dominican Republic, small group size is an important feature of successful
micro-lending programs.
In this paper, we focus on the equilibrium size of the borrower group from the perspective of a prot-
maximizing nancier. We build a model where social ties a¤ect incentives to exert e¤ort on borrowers
individual projects under moral hazard. In particular, we assume that every borrower can be characterized
by a level of social capital that represents the strength of the borrowers social attachment to the community
she is part of. Borrowers with a higher level of social capital are easier to provide incentives to work. This
may be the case, for example, because borrowers with strong social ties are more sensitive to non-nancial
sanctions than borrowers less attached to their community. Social ties are therefore important but the model
does not require that borrowers are jointly liable for the loan. We show the existence of an optimal group
size determined by the level of social capital of the marginal borrower that is eligible for funding under
moral hazard. Our result suggests that if the group is chosen to maximize the nanciers prots, group size
is limited: it depends on the strength of the borrowers social ties whether the borrower becomes part of the
group. We show that the chosen group size increases in the projects prot potential and decreases in the
expected agency cost the nancier is required to pay to compensate borrowers for their e¤orts.
In our model, group size has two countervailing e¤ects on the nanciers prots. An increase in group size
1An important di¤erence between the two types of organizations is that while micronance institutions obtain most of their
lending capital from external nancial institutions, in credit cooperatives members capital contributions represent a major
source of funding.
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increases the banks customer base and thus the amount of capital to lend. On the other hand, increasing
group size entails the involvement of borrowers with less social capital. The nancier needs to remunerate
those borrowers by paying large agency costs, thereby reducing prots. Consequently, agency costs together
with borrowersheterogeneity in terms of social ties su¢ ce to show that the number of borrowers in the
group is limited.
The theoretical literature on group lending has mainly focused on the e¤ect of joint liability on group
membersrepayment incentives. Besley and Coate (1995) show that the possibility of imposing social sanc-
tions decreases group membersincentives to default. Ghatak (2000) argues that joint liability lending can be
used as a screening device through the instrument of peer selection.2 Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) provide
a comprehensive analysis on how joint liability lending may mitigate information and enforcement problems
in communities with strong social ties. We contribute to this literature by showing, in a framework without
joint liability but with socially connected borrowers, that moral hazard considerations impose an upper limit
on group size.
The next section describes the basic model and our main result. Section 2 and 3 consider robustness
issues. Section 4 concludes.
2 Basic Model
Consider the problem of a nancier engaged in lending to a group of nancially constrained borrowers.
Borrowers are subject to moral hazard and di¤er in terms of the level of social and nancial capital they
possess. The model has one period. At the beginning of the period, each borrower decides whether to invest
in a project that requires investment I. The investment project yields R in case of success and 0 in case of
failure. If the borrower exerts e¤ort on her project, the probability of success is pH . If the borrower does
not exert e¤ort, the probability of success is pL and the borrower derives private benet of size sB. Hence,
the opportunity cost of working depends on the borrowers social capital (1  s). A borrower with a higher
level of social capital obtains private benets of a lower amount when shirking. This assumption captures
the idea that borrowers with strong within-group social ties are easily punished by non-nancial sanctions.
We assume that s is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1]. Each borrower has a specic amount of
nancial capital A, where A is uniformly distributed on the interval

0; A

. Finally, we assume that the
nancier requires a gross return (1 + i) on the investment.
The borrower exerts e¤ort if the incentive compatibility constraint holds.
pHRb  pLRb + sB
() Rb  sB
p
(1)
2Other important papers adressing adverse selection issues in group lending include Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier
(2000), La¤ont and NGuessan (2000), and La¤ont (2003).
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The nanciers participation constraint and the condition for nancing can be written as:
pH (R Rb)  (1 + i) (I  A) ;
A  I   pH
R  sBp
(1 + i)
= A(s) (2)
The nancier may provide funding for every project that satises the nancing condition. Notice that
A (s) is increasing in s and therefore decreasing in borrowerssocial capital.
We denote the nanciers prots by . Since s is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] ; we can write  as a
function of the level of social capital of the marginal borrower that can be funded under moral hazard, bs.
 = (1 + i)
bsZ
0
[I  A(s)] Pr [A(bs)  A  A(1)] ds (3)
In what follows, we denote the nanciers equilibrium choice of the banks customer base by s and refer
to s as the optimal group size. The following proposition states that a prot-maximizing nancier chooses
the banks customer base such that s < 1.
Proposition 1 There exists a level of social capital s 2 (0; 1) that maximizes the nanciers prots and
thereby denes the optimal size of the borrower group. The optimal size of the group increases in the projects
expected prot potential pHR and decreases in the expected agency cost to be paid to borrowers
pHB
p .
The proposition suggests that group size is limited: a prot-maximizing nancier does not provide
nancial capital to all borrowers that are fundable under moral hazard. The nancier may increase the
amount of capital to be lent by including a larger number of borrowers in the group. Providing funding to
borrowers with low social capital will however decrease prots because of the inherent moral hazard problem.
The nancier has a trade-o¤ between raising prots by increasing group size and paying a high agency rent
to socially less connected borrowers. The high agency cost to be paid to borrowers with low social capital
makes the nancier choose the size of the group in a manner that not all borrowers that would otherwise be
fundable, even under moral hazard, may realize their investment projects. The result is in line with Devereux
and Fishe (1993) suggesting that the borrower group must be composed of fairly homogenous individuals.
Our nding is also consistent with lending practices of the historical German cooperatives. Ghatak and
Guinnane (1999) cite examples of German credit cooperatives that denied loans to their members. In 1888,
the cooperative in Diestedde (Münsterland) rejected the application of a skilled artisan for a small loan.
In 1913, the Limbach cooperative in Saarland did not admit two individuals as members and did not give
justication for the decision.3 Furthermore, cooperatives gave loans to some members while having required
additional security. For example, the cooperative in Leer (Münsterland) provided a loan to a borrower in
1909 on the condition that two persons co-sign the agreement.4
3Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) cite the cooperative records of the Protokollbuch für den Vorstandas their resource for such
examples.
4Co-signing is a form of joint liability between the borrower and the co-signer.
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3 Financiers Information Advantage
In this section, we extend the basic model of section 2 and show that our result holds for a more general
model set-up where the nancier obtains information about project quality. The borrower has no ability to
assess the quality of her project.
We assume that, before the borrower exerts e¤ort, the nancier observes information about the projects
payo¤ perspectives. Assume that for any project, the ex-ante probability of a good payo¤ perspective is
. The nancier observes the state of the project with probability (1  q).5 When payo¤ perspectives are
good, the borrowers e¤ort does not matter the project will succeed. When payo¤ perspectives are bad,
the borrower needs to exert e¤ort to achieve a high success probability.
The borrowers incentive constraint is thus as follows.
(1  ) pHRB  (1  ) pLRB + (1  ) sB
() Rb  sB
p
(4)
The nanciers participation constraint and the nancing condition are:
[ + (1  ) pH ]R 

q ( + (1  ) pH) sB
p
+ (1  q) (1  ) pH sB
p

 (1 + i) (I  A)
() A  I  
[ + (1  ) pH ]R  ((1  ) pH + q) sBp
(1 + i)
= A(s) (5)
The following proposition states that the result obtained in section 2 is robust to the introduction of
asymmetric information into the basic model.
Proposition 2 Assume the nancier has information about project quality unattainable for the borrower.
Even under this assumption, there exists a level of social capital se 2 (0; 1) that maximizes the nanciers
prots and thereby denes the optimal size of the borrower group. The optimal size of the group se in-
creases in the expected revenues of the project [ + (1  ) pH ]R and decreases in the expected agency costh
((1  ) pH + q) Bp
i
.
4 Robustness
In previous sections, we assumed that borrowersnancial A capital was uniformly distributed on the interval
0; A

. We now consider the robustness of our results by assuming a general distribution function for A.
We assume that each borrower has a specic amount of nancial capital A, where A is distributed on
[0; A(1)], with a cumulative distribution function F and a density function f(:). For this distribution, we
require that the monotone hazard rate assumption holds: [1 F (:)]f(:) is non-increasing.
The following Proposition states that our main result is robust to the introduction of a general distribution
function.
5Another interpretation would be that the nancier is able to monitor borrowers with an imperfect monitoring technology.
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Proposition 3 Assume a general distribution function for borrowersnancial capital A. There exists a
level of social capital bsg 2 (0; 1) that maximizes the nanciers prots and thereby denes optimal group size.
The optimal size of the group increases in expected project revenues and decreases in the expected agency
cost to be paid to borrowers.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we focused on group lending from the perspective of a prot-maximizing nancier. We showed
that when social ties in a community a¤ect borrowersincentives to work the optimal size of the group the
nancier lends to is limited. A prot-maximizing nancier chooses the size of the borrowing group in a way
that borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have insu¢ cient social ties do not receive
funding. Consequently, the size of the borrowing group chosen by the nancier is limited. The result arises
because both social and nancial capital matter for the funding of nancially constrained borrowers: the
nancier faces a trade-o¤ between raising the size of the bank and providing incentives for borrowers with
limited social connections. The result may explain why many micro-lending institutions and rural credit
cooperatives lend to groups of small size.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Given the nancing condition dened in (2), we write the amount of capital to
be lent as a function of the level of social capital of the marginal borrower that can be funded under moral
hazard, bs.
 = (1 + i)
bsZ
0
[I  A(s)] Pr [A(bs)  A  A(1)] ds
= (1 + i) (F [A(1)]  F [A(bs)]) bsZ
0
[I  A(s)] ds
=
 
pHRbs  (bs)2
2
pHB
p
!
(F [A(1)]  F [A(bs)]) (6)
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The nancier will choose the size of the group by maximizing the amount of capital to be lent and thereby
prots. Since A is uniformly distributed on

0; A

, we can write ddbs as follows:
d
dbs =
0@ (1 + i) [I  A(bs)] (F [A(1)]  F [A(bs)])
 bs hI  A(bs) + 1(1+i) bs2 pHBp i pHBp f [A(bs)]
1A
=
1
A
0@ (1 + i) [I  A(bs)] [A(1) A(bs)]
 bs hI  A(bs) + 1(1+i) bs2 pHBp i Bp
1A
=
1
A
0@ [I  A(bs)] (1  bs) pHBp
 bs hI  A(bs) + 1(1+i) bs2 pHBp i pHBp
1A (7)
Solving for the optimal size of the group s :
d
dbs =
0@ [I  A(bs)] (1  bs)
 bs hI  A(bs) + 1(1+i) bs2 pHBp i
1A = 0
()
 
[I  A(bs)] (1  2bs)  1
(1 + i)
(bs)2
2
pHB
p
!
= 0
()
 
1
(1 + i)

pH

R  bsB
p

(1  2bs)  1
(1 + i)
(bs)2
2
pHB
p
!
= 0
() pHR  bs2pHR+ pHB
p

+
3
2
pHB
p
(bs)2 = 0 (8)
The above expression is a second degree polynomial ax2 + bx + c = 0; with a  0; b  0 and c  0: We
therefore have 2 positive roots. Moreover, this polynomial is positive for bs = 0; and negative for bs = 1.
Indeed:
d
dbs (bs = 0) = 1A 1(1 + i)pHR > 0 (9)
d
dbs (bs = 1) = 1A 1(1 + i)pH

1
2
B
p
 R

=
1
A

A

1
2

  I

< 0: (10)
Let s be the lowest root of this polynomial, ddbs is positive for all bs 2 [0; s] and negative for all bs 2 [s; 1].
Since  is concave in bs, s is a maximum of the function (bs). Indeed,
d2
dbs2 =  2pHR  pHBp + 3pHBp s =  2

pHR  spHB
p

  pHB
p
(1  s)  0 (11)
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Using equation (8) in the proof of Proposition 1 we dene the optimal size of the group s, as follows:
s =

2pHR+
pHB
p

 
r
2pHR+
pHB
p
2
  6pHBp pHR
3 Bp
() s = 1
3
0B@"2pHRpHB
p
+ 1
#
 
vuut"2pHR
pHB
p
+ 1
#2
  2pHR
pHB
p
1CA
() s = 1
3
0B@"2pHRpHB
p
+ 1
#
 
vuut4"pHR
pHB
p
#2
+ 1
1CA
() s = 1
3

2y + 1 
q
[2y + 1]
2   2y

=
1
3

2y + 1 
p
4y2 + 1

(12)
where y = pHRpHB
p
.
@s
@y
=
1
3
 
2  4yp
4y2 + 1
!
=
2
3
0BBBB@1 
2 pHRpHB
ps
4

pHR
pHB
p
2
+ 1
1CCCCA  0 (13)
Therefore, @s

@y  0: The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given the nancing condition dened in (5), we write the amount of capital to
be lent as a function of the level of social capital of the marginal borrower that can be funded under moral
hazard, bs. If s is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] ; we have:
 = (1 + i)
bsZ
0
[I  A(s)] Pr [A(bs)  A  A(1)] ds
=
 
[ + (1  ) pH ]Rbs  ((1  ) pH + q) (bs)2
2
B
p
!
(F [A(1)]  F [A(bs)]) (14)
Again, nancier chooses the size of the group by maximizing the amount of capital to be lent and thereby prof-
its. The results are therefore the same as in Proposition 1 replacing the expected revenues of the project pHR
by [ + (1  ) pH ]R and the expected agency cost to be paid to the borrower Bp by ((1  ) pH + q) Bp .
Proof of Proposition 3. The optimal group size is dened by the following condition:
d
dbs =
0@ (1 + i) [I  A(bs)] (F [A(1)]  F [A(bs)])
 bs hI  A(bs) + 1(1+i) bs2 ((1 )pH+q)Bp i ((1 )pH+q)Bp f [A(bs)]
1A = 0
()
0B@ (1+i)[1 F (A(bs))]((1 )pH+q)Bp f [A(bs)]
 
hbs+ 1(1+i) (bs)22[I A(bs)] ((1 )pH+q)Bp i
1CA = 0 (15)
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By assumption: dds

[1 F (A(bs))]
f(A(bs))

 0 and dds

(bs)2
[I A(bs)]

=
2bs[I A(bs)]+ 1
(1+i)
((1 )pH+q)B
p (bs)2
[I A(bs)]2  0: This implies
that that  is concave in bs: Moreover:
d
dbs (bs = 0) = [I  A(0)] [1  F (A(0))] > 0 (16)
d
dbs (bs = 1) =  

I  A(1
2
)

((1  ) pH + q)B
p
f (A(1)) < 0 (17)
This implies that the equation ddbs = 0 admits a unique solution sr on [0; 1] : If we denote by E (R) ; the
expected project revenues and by E (B) ; the expected agency cost to be paid to borrowers, we obtain:
d
dbs =
0@ [E (R)  bsE (B)] (1  F [A(bs)])
  1(1+i)bs [E (R)  bsE (B)] + bs2E (B)E (B) f [A(bs)]
1A = 0 (18)
Using the implicit function theorem, we have:
dsr
dE (R)
=  
d2
dbsdE(R)
d2
dbs2 =  
(1  F [A(bs)])  1(1+i) [E (R)  bsE (B)]E (B) f [A(bs)]
d2
dbs2  0 (19)
dsr
dE (B)
=  
d2
dbsdE(B)
d2
dbs2 =  
 bs (1  F [A(bs)])  1(1+i) [E (R)  bsE (B)]E (B) f [A(bs)]
d2
dbs2  0 (20)
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